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1. Introduction
Population Growth and degradation o f  the environm ent are known to be two 
o f  the m ost serious problems o f  mankind. Population pressure significantly 
contributes to  environmental deterioration as natural resources are used more 
intensively. However, the literature on econom ic growth and environm ent assumes 
population either to be constant or to  grow at a constant exogenous rate. The 
empirical evidence, though, suggests that fertility depends on incom e and other 
variables like the wage rate or female education [see Wahl (1985), Barro/Lee 
(1994), Schultz (1989) and (1994), Rosenzweig (1990) or Wang et al. (1994)]. The 
m odel set up in  this paper studies the interdependence between population, 
economic  growth and the environment and takes the empirical results on fertility 
into account. For this reason, the fertility decision o f  the household is endogenous. 
Fertility decreases with higher wages and higher education as suggested by the 
empirical studies. There are two external effects on  the environm ent in the market 
equilibrium. First, firms do not internalize the environmental damage caused by 
production. Second, households do not consider that having more children puts 
higher pressure on the natural ressources and the environment.
Recently, the trade-off between environmental care and econom ic growth has 
received increasing interest in the academic literature. The intertemporal allocation 
o f  resources and accumulation o f  capital is studied either in an OLG model or 
in a Ramsey model. I f  environmental damage is caused by the use o f  physical 
capital in production and a larger stock o f  capital leads to higher pollution, 
environm ental care necessitates a higher social interest rate. Therefore, the optimal 
capital intensity and consum ption levels are lower in the Ram sey model with
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exogenous econom ic progress, while the socially optimal growth rate is unaffected.1 
In the elementary ‘A k’-model with endogenous growth as described by Rebelo
(1991), increasing preferences for the environment, however, reduce the optimal 
growth rate which depends positively on the rate o f  interest [Gradus/Smulders 
(1993)]. I f  human Capital accumulation is the engine o f  growth, on the contrary, 
the optim al growth rate might even be higher. The reason is simple. Higher 
environmental care does not affect the human capital accumulation directly. If 
there is any effect on the growth rate, it is through the environment’s impact on 
individuals’ learning abilities. If less pollution makes learning a more productive 
activity, the growth rate, o f  course, increases with higher concem  for the 
environment.
In recent policy proposals on tax reforms, the ‘double dividend hypothesis' has 
been discussed lively and has received increasing public attention. The double 
dividend hypothesis states that the substitution o f  environmental taxes for income 
taxes yields two dividends. The first dividend is a cleaner environment. The second 
dividend is a less distortionary tax system.2 If the double dividend hypothesis 
holds, the im plications for fiscal policies are straightforward: Income taxes should 
be reduced while pollution taxes should be increased. If the double dividend 
hypothesis does not hold, instead, poJicy recommendations are hard to  fonnulate 
as the welfare gain from a cleaner environment has to be estimated explicitly. 
Bovenberg/van der Ploeg (1994) and Bovenberg/de Mooij (1994) find that 
environmental taxes typically render the tax system less efficient. For this reason, 
they study a second-best general equilibrium model where the government has to 
finance its spendings by distortionary taxes and cannot rely on lump-sum taxation. 
In their model, labour income decreases as environmental taxes are increased. As 
a consequence, the labour income tax base is reduced and tax revenues from labor 
income might fall b y  m ore  than the revenues generated by the environmental tax. 
As a consequence, the government might have to raise the labour tax rate increasing 
the distortions in the economy.
In this paper, econom ic development and environmental quality are studied in 
a model o f  endogenous growth. Human capital accumulation is the engine o f  
growth. The population is growing at an endogenous rate and intensifies the 
pressure on the environment. The impact o f  labour income taxation and emission 
taxation on the population, the economic growth rate and the environment is 
analyzed for a market equilibrium. As a result, a rise in both tax rates increases 
population growth and reduces economic growth. The effect on the environment 
depends on the size o f  the government sector. However, one might not preclude 
that a higher environmental tax will improve  the environment only in the short 
run but not in the long run. Furthermore, the double dividend hypothesis is
1 An extensive overview on how pollution can be integrated in the Standard Ramsey model 
is provided by van der Ploeg and Whithagen (1991).
2 For the various definitions of the double dividend hypothesis that exist in the academic 
literature the reader is referred to Goulder (1994).
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examined for a growing econom y. It is shown that switching to environmental 
taxes does give a second dividend, i.e. the econom ic growth rate increases while 
population growth declines.
The paper is organized as follow s. In section 2, the m odel o f  economic 
developm ent and the environm ent is introduced. In section 3, the equilibrium and 
steady state conditions are derived. Furthermore, existence and stability o f  the 
growth equilibrium are established. The effects o f  incom e and emission taxation 
are studied in section 4. In particular, the double dividend hypothesis is proven. 
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
I w ill consider a simple extension o f  the Standard overlapping generations model 
ä la D iam ond (1965) to  an endogenous growth m odel. G row th depends on time 
people spend on human Capital accumulation similar to Lucas (1988). There are 
three sectors in the economy: the households, the firms and the government sector. 
H ouseholds maximize their utility w hich is a function o f  consum ption, environ­
mental pollution and the number o f  children. Firms maximize profits and produce 
output with the help o f  labour and capital. Further, production is assumed to 
have a polluting effect on environmental quality. This negative effect on house- 
hold’s utility is not internalized by the firm owners. The government collects 
revenues from taxes on labour incom e and on em issions by the firms. The tax 
revenues are transferred to the households as a lump sum.
2.1 Households
The econom y consists o f  N, identical individuals b om  at time t. Individuals 
live two periods. They work in the first period o f  their life eam ing the wage rate 
wt and retire in the second period o f  their life. A n individual born at time t 
consum es c u  when he is young and c2t+l when he is old. Therefore, part o f  the 
first-period incom e is saved in order to finance the second-period consumption.
The number o f  households N t is growing at the rate nt — 1, N ,+l =  n ,N r  
U tility is a function o f  the number o f  children n ,.3 A s a simple justification of 
this assumption, parents might derive pleasure from their children. Altematively, 
children can be interpreted as a necessary input into hom e production. E.g., 
children in rural areas o f  developing countries might collect firewood, fetch water 
or graze cattle [Dasgupta (1992), D asgupta (1994)]. A s a consequence, children 
do increase parents’ utility by allowing for a higher com sum ption o f  hom e goods. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that utility from children does only depend on the
3 For empirical evidence on the endogenity of the fertility decision, the reader is referred 
to Wang et al. (1994).
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number o f  children n, and not on the quality o f  the children like in Becker/Barro 
(1989) or Becker et al. (1990). Utility is also a function o f  the pollution level P, 
and P t + 1 in the tw o periods o f  life. For analytical convenience, utility is assumed 
to be additive in its arguments:
(1) u, =  ln c u  +  ln c 2t+1 +  01n n, +  o (P „ P t+1), <j>,9> 0, u' < 0 .
The parameter 0 denotes the subjective discount rate, and » ( . , . )  denotes the 
disutility from pollution in period t and t + 1 .  Parents are non-altruistic and, 
consequently, do not account for the utility o f  their children.
The households face two kinds o f  constraints: a time constraint and a budget 
constraint. Each individual is endowed with one unit o f  time in each period. 
When young, the household can either work, raise children or spend time on 
learning activities. The time necessary for raising the children increases with the 
number o f  children n t. Each child takes k  units o f  time.4 The household can also 
allocate time hs on learning activities which will determine her human capital H r  
The remaining time, 1 — tcnt — ht, is supplied as labour. The household also faces 
a budget constraint as she cannot spend more than her income:
(2) (1 -  t)(1  -  Knt -  ht) H tw, +  T, =  c u +  Cl ' ~  .
l  +  rt +1
Her gross wage incom e is given by the product o f  the wage rate w,, her working 
time, l  — Knt —h„ and her human capital H t. The tax rate on labour income is 
denoted by r. The household also receives transfers from the government at the 
amount o f  Tt. The income is spent on her intertemporal consumption { c 1(,c 2l+, }■ 
The consum ption in the second period c 2l+1 is financed from savings s t which 
receive interest at the rate rl+1: c2t+1 =  (1 +  rl + 1)s r
As is obvious from (2), children generate opportunity costs proportional to the 
wage incom e o f  the parents. The higher the fertility n, o f  households, the more 
time peopie spend raising the children foregoing income. There are no goods’ 
costs o f  children in this model. This assumption is only justified for medium- to 
high-income countries. In the early stage o f  development, consumption per child 
is an important cost component to the parents. E.g., parents have to provide food 
and clothing to the children. Thus, for very poor countries, fertility might increase 
initially with rising income. For medium- and high-income countries, the time 
costs o f  children are more important to the households’ fertility decision and, 
consequently, fertility is a negative function o f  income. According to empirical 
findings o f  Barro/Sala-I-Martin (1995), the latter countries are characterized by
4 The functional form of the time spent on raising children, Kn,, need not be linear for the 
theoretical results o f this paper to hold but only increasing in the number of children 
It is merely assumed in order to derive closed-form solutions for the endogenous variables.
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a G D P  per capita exceeding $800  (in 1985 U S dollars). The m odel concentrates 
on the medium- and high-incom e countries where time opportunity costs o f 
children are the predominant determinant o f  the fertility decision. The countries 
who display a negative correlation o f  fertility and incom e also represent the 
majority o f  countries worldwide.
2.2 Human Capital Accumulation
ln  recent contributions to  the theory o f  endogenous growth, human Capital 
accum ulation has been emphasized as a major engine o f  growth, e.g. Lucas (1988), 
Lucas (1990), and Grüner/Heer (1994). Empirical support for the hypothesis that 
knowledge is a major contribution to  growth has been provided by Adams (1990), 
Barro (1991) or Levine/Renelt (1992) am ong others. In this kind o f  model, the 
time people spend on accumulating human Capital determines the econom ic growth 
rate. The follow ing m odel builds on the work o f  Lucas (1988). It is assumed that 
human Capital depends on  the learning effort o f  an individual and is produced 
with constant returns to scale. In particular, human capital H,  is accumulated 
according to:
(3) H t =  (Aht + \ ) H t . u
where A denotes the productivity o f  the individual’s learning effort.5
2.3 Production
Firms act competitively and use labour L t and physical Capital K ,  as inputs 
into production o f  the good  Yt. Labour L t is measured in efficiency units and is 
the product o f  the working time, the number o f  people and their human capital, 
L,  =  (1 - Knc -  hl) H 1N r  Production uses the public good  environment as an 
input, e.g. in the form o f  water or air. The use o f  the natural resource is assumed 
to cause proportional costs to the producer at the am ount o f  <5. For example, the 
firm might have to pump the water to the plant or build a stack in order to dispose 
o f the polluted air. In addition, the government raises a tax n on emissions P,-6 
Firms can use labour and capital for abatem ent activities and, this way, reduce
5 According to equation (3), human capital is produced only with labour but not with 
capital. Altematively, one could include physical capital as a second factor of production 
in (3). However, this would not change the results as long as the production of human 
capital is relatively intensive in human capital compared to the production of goods. 
Further, allowing for depreciation of the human capital stock H, does not change the 
qualitative results either as long as people spend nonnegative time on learning, ht >  0.
6 n might be interpreted in many ways. E.g., in many developing countries, the use of 
energy is subsidized by the government. A cut in energy subsidises is equivalent to a rise in it.
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emissions Pt. O f course, allocating more labour and Capital to the reduction o f  
pollution decreases the use o f  these inputs in the production o f  the output good  
Yt. A s a consequence, labour L v  Capital K t and the emission o f  pollutants Pt are 
substitutes in production.7 For analytical convenience, suppose that the production 
function o f  output Fr is Cobb-Douglas:
(4) Y, =  F { K t, L „ P t), =  K ? P ? L r * ~ ß, 
or
(5) y ,  =  k ? p f ,  with y t =  I l , Pt =  p - ^ k t =  ^ .
Lut L,t L t
Firms maximize profits so that factors are rewarded with their marginal products. 
The marginal product o f  labour, measured in efficiency units, equals the wage 
rate wt , the one o f  Capital equals the interest rate r t, and the one o f  pollutants is 
equal to the sum o f  the emission tax rate n and the pollution costs S:
(6) w, =  ( 1  - < x ~ ß ) k “p “,
(7) 71 +  8 =  ß k “p P ~ l ,
(8) r ^ a k r ' p f .
2.4 Government
The government receives income from the emission tax, nPn and the income tax, 
t(1 — Knt — ht) w tH ,N t . The government budget is balanced in all periods and 
tax revenues are transferred to the households lump-sum:
(9) Tt =  t(1  — Kn, — ht )w tH,  +  n
Let ip t denote the size o f  the government sector in period t and be defined as total 
government revenues in relation to total output, xpt =  With the help o f  (5), 
(6) and (7), the governmental size tpt can be expressed as a function o f  the two 
tax rates t  and 7t:
ß
(10) v ( t ,7 t)  =  t(1  — a — ß )  +  7t
n +  <5
1 Likewise, high pollution might indicate inefflcient use of energy. If, for example, an 
engine is not buming fuel efficiently because the machine is of low quality (K, is small), 
the emission of pollutants P, is high.
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3. S teady State
In equilibrium, factor markets clear and the factor prices equal their respective 
marginal products as given by (6 )-(8 ) . The households maximize their utility (1) 
subject to their time and budget constraint (2) and their human Capital (3). The 
first'Order conditions are given by:
(11) 1 + 1
(12) n,
C 2 l + 1   ̂ +  r t + l  
<f> C u
K  (1 — T )W ,H,  ’
The necessary conditions (11)—(13) are easy to interpret. The optimal intertem­
poral consum ption allocatiön is given by (11). The marginal rate o f substitution 
equals one plus the interest rate. Further, the marginal utility from having more 
children, equals the opportunity costs o f  raising children, fc( 1 — x )w t H j c u . 
Finally, according to (13), the individual allocates her time on learning h, in order 
to  maximize her incom e as given in (2). Her intertemporal consum ption allocation
(11) together with the budget constraint (2) and the government transfers (9) 
imply savings s t:
(14) 1
2 +  ( P + n-4*1 (”4t) 1 'P (1 - k». - K)H,ktv71 +  d j  \ 7 t  +  0  '
In Capital market equilibrium, savings equal investments:
(15) s ,N ,  =  K t + l .
The first-order conditions (11)—(13), the factor market equilibrium (6 )-(8 ), and 
the capital market equilibrium (15) can be solved to give a difference equation 
system in the three endogenous variables nt , k, and h„  which completely describe 
the dynamics o f  the economy:
(16) n, =
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(17)
2 2A  2 ’
(18) k  -  1 ^ - Kn> - h^ 1 - a ~ ß  + ni h )  (  ß
1+1 2 +  0 ( i - K n t + i - h , + i )(Aht+1 +  l )n t \ n  +  S j
A steady state is characterized by a constant capital intensity k, a constant 
population growth rate n and a stationary time allocation. As a consequence, the 
econom ic growth rate o f  per capita output g  equals the growth rate o f  human 
capital, and is constant, too:
(19) gs L̂y/^+1= %7F±i = ̂  + 1-K , /N t YJN,
N otice that capital K „  effective labour Z „  and production all grow at the same 
rate. In a market equilibrium, firms do not intemalize the negative external effect 
o f production on individuals’ utility such that total pollution Pt will also grow at 
the sam e rate as output Yt :
(20) g P =  =  (Ah +  1)«.
* t
As is evident from equations (16)—(18), a steady state (n, h, k )  characterized by 
non-negative growth o f  per-capita output, g >  0, exists if  and only if the 
productivity o f  the education sector is sufficiently large:
(2 1 ) A > +
1 — r 2 +  6 1 - a - ß
Accordingly, for a large government sector tp, and, therefore, high tax rates z and 
n, the productivity o f  the education sector A has to increase in order to ensure 
human capital accumulation to take place. In the following, condition (21) is 
assumed to hold.
Besides the existence o f  the steady state, one also has to check for its stability in 
order to  get meaningful results. The following proposition establishes local 
stability.
Proposition 1: Local Stability  
The steady state, characterized by k t = k , n t —n and h, =  h for all periods t, is 
locally stable.
Proof: According to (16) and (17), fertility n, and time spent on leaming activities
h, instantaneously take their steady state values n and h, respectively. For local 
stability, thus, a sufficient and necessary condition is given by \dkl + i /dk,\ <  1,
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where the derivative is evaluated at the steady state (n, h, k ) .  It is easy to see 
from  (18) that this condition is equivalent to a +  ß < l  for k t + l = k ,  =  k. 
H owever, this is the case for the production function (4).
4. S teady State Responses to Tax Changes
In this simple m odel, a change in the two tax rates affects the decision o f  the 
representative household and the firms. The mechanism is the same for both tax 
rates. Increasing the incom e tax rate x decreases the opportunity costs o f  children 
and, in this section, it is shown that higher incom e taxation increases fertility and 
reduces growth. Similarly, following higher emission taxation, firms decrease the 
use o f  natural resources in production and Pt declines relative to K ,  and L r  As 
a consequence, the marginal product o f  labour as given by (6) is reduced, and 
econom ic growth will decline, too. The growth rate o f  pollutants as given by (20) 
may either decline or increase depending on the size o f  the government sector ip. 
The result is stated in proposition 2. In this section, a differential tax incidence 
analysis is also effectuated. The reduction o f  labour incom e taxes accompanied 
by an equivalent increase in pollution taxation is proven to increase economic 
growth giving support to  the double dividend hypothesis. This result is stated in 
proposition 3.
Proposition 2
A  rise in the incom e tax rate x or the em ission tax rate n reduces economic 
growth g  and increases population growth n in the steady state. The growth rate 
o f pollution g P increases if  and only if
1 ^  ^ 1 1 ~  a ~  ß  +  7Ce+s .
1 ' 2 +  0 2 1 — t  \ — a — ß
Proof: W ith (16) and n, =  n, % >  0 and f*.
Together with h, — h and equation (17), this also implies §£ <  0 and %  As the 
growth rate o f  output per capita is given by (19), econom ic growth declines as 
well. Finally, condition (22) implies
(23) ^ - u *  +  1)±  + , f a " >  0.
dx dx dx
Similarly, >  0 if  (22) holds. 
an
The second result o f  proposition 2 is rather surprising. Taxing pollution might 
eventually harm the environment. The reason is the endogenity o f  the fertility 
decision. If the emission tax rate n increases, econom ic growth decreases as people
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spend less time learning. In this simple model, less econom ic growth corresponds 
to less pollution for constant population growth rate n as the pollution growth 
rate g P =  (Ah +  1 )n goes down. However, as the opportunity costs o f  children 
decreases as well, fertility n increases and this effect might even dominate the 
output reduction effect if  condition (22) holds.
O f particular importance, o f  course, is the question how an increase o f  the 
emission tax combined with an equivalent decrease in the income tax does affect 
growth and the environment. A s a higher pollution tax rate n decreases the growth 
rate g  while a lower income tax rate t  increases the growth rate g, the net effect 
on econom ic growth is a priori unclear. Proposition 3 summarizes the results from 
this differential tax incidence analysis.
Proposition 3
For a constant size o f  the government sector tp, an increase o f  the emission tax 
rate n combined with a reduction in the income tax rate % increases economic 
growth and also decreases population growth. It positively affects the environment,
i.e. the growth rate o f  pollutants g P decreases, if  and only if  condition (22) holds.
Proof: In order to keep the government size tp constant in the steady state, an 
increase o f  n has to be offset by a decrease in income taxation:
(24) d% ßS
dn (n +  <5)2(1 — a — ß )
It is easy to show from (16) that ^  <  0 for constant ip. Similarly, human Capital
drc
accumulation h and the growth rate g  increase.
^  <  0 and g P =  (Ah  +  1 )n =  ( äJ^ f £B)n further imply that — ■ <  0 if (22) holds. 
u7r an
So far, n has denoted the number o f  children. The result o f propositions 2 and
3 can also be interpreted in a different way. Assume population N, to be constant.
For k  =  1, let n  denote the leisure time. In this case, individuals derive utility as
given by (1) from leisure rather than from children. An increase in the two tax
rates reduces the opportunity costs o f  leisure as the wage rate w, falls. As a
consequence, both labour supply and time spent on learning decrease. Thus, if
labour supply is endogenous both taxes reduce growth even for countries
characterized by a small elasticity o f  fertility with regard to income. Furthermore,
proposition 3 implies that the double dividend also holds in the case o f  endogenous
labour supply. In the present model, a switch from income taxation to emission
taxation which keeps the government size constant increases growth unambigously.
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5. Conclusion
I have described a m odel with endogenous growth. The environm ent is a public 
good which is used as an input into production. Growth is stimulated by the 
accum ulation o f  human capital. Endogenizing the household’s fertility decision 
provided interesting and surprising results. In accordance with other models of 
endogenous growth like Barro (1990) or Barro/Sala-I-M artin (1992), income 
taxation is found to reduce the growth rate, even though the mechanism is a 
different one. Similar results are derived for an em ission tax. Emission taxation, 
even though it has a positive level effect on the environm ental quality, is likely 
to increase the rate o f  pollution growth and, hence, might even be disadvantageous 
to the environm ent in the long run. A s a second result, I show ed that, for given 
size o f  the government sector, a switch from  incom e to em ission taxation increases 
the growth rate confirming the double dividend hypothesis.
The results have to be interpreted carefully since my analysis disregarded any 
governmental expenditures on the environment. A lso , pollution is caused by the 
production o f  the firms only and not by consum ption. However, the purpose of 
m y analysis only was to illustrate one potential adverse effect o f  emission and 
incom e taxation, namely that a reduction in the wage rate net o f  taxes implies 
higher population growth and, hence, less econom ic growth. The extent o f  this 
effect, o f  course, depends on the sensitivity o f  the fertility decison on income which 
is an empirical question. Accordingly, my results emphasize the necessity to 
combine fiscal policy with population policies in developing countries. A  reduction 
o f  labour incom e should be com pensated for by alternative policy measures in 
order to reduce population growth, e.g. with the help o f  family planning programs 
or female and male education programs. In particular, the opportunity costs o f 
wom en’s time in childbearing should be increased.
Finally, I would like to m ention another caveat o f  my analysis regarding the 
effects o f  incom e and emission taxation. In the real world, the input factor labour 
is not hom ogenous as assumed in this paper. One might distinguish skilled and 
unskilled labour. Furthermore, I did not account for technical progress. An 
emission tax will give incentives to  intensify research in abatem ent technologies 
and will prom ote environmental technical progress. The higher research effort 
will increase demand for skilled labour endowed with high human capital. 
Consequently, the wage o f  skilled workers will rise relatively to the wage o f  the 
unskilled workers and, as a consequence, individuals will try to  acquire more skills 
and to build up more human capital. This growth-enhancing effect o f  emission 
taxation will not occur in the case o f  incom e taxation.8
In conclusion, tw o directions o f  future research on econom ic development and 
the environm ent seem worth m entioning to me. First, one m ight analyze a general
8 Bovenberg/Smulders (1995) incorporate pollution-augmenting technological change in a 
model o f economic growth and establish that higher pollution taxes increase long-run 
growth.
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equilibrium model o f  endogenous growth with two kinds o f  technical progress, 
one environmental and one labour-augmenting. On the one hand, the govemm ent 
might engage or subsidize abatement activities and environmental technical 
progress. On the other hand, a private research & development sector might 
engage in innovative activites like in Grossman/Helpman (1991) or A ghion/H owitt
(1992). O f course, a fundamental problem o f  such an analysis would consist in 
specifying the positive external effects o f  knowledge flowing between the two 
reserarch sectors. Second, utility, in this paper, is assumed to depend exclusively 
on the number o f  children and not the ‘quality’ o f  the children. Utility could be 
m odelled as a function o f  both the number o f  children and the human Capital per 
child, thus introducing an additional trade-off between population growth and 
econom ic growth. Similar to the analysis o f  Becker et al. (1990), one might end 
up with the possibility o f  a poverty trap characterized by high growth rates o f  
both population and pollution.
Zusammenfassung
D er Einfluß einer Einkommens- und Umweltbesteuerung auf die wirtschafliche 
Entwicklung und die Umwelt wird für das Konkurrenzgleichgewicht eines 
endogenen Wachstumsmodeils untersucht. Wachstum wird durch die Akkumula­
tion von Humankapital hervorgerufen, und die Fertilitätsentscheidung der Haus­
halte erfolgt endogen. Unter der Annahme, daß die Erziehung der Kinder Zeit 
benötigt und vom  Lohn abhängige Opportunitätskosten beinhaltet, erhöhen 
sowohl eine Lohnsteuer als auch eine Umweltsteuer das Bevölkerungswachstum  
und beeinträchtigen das Wirtschaftswachstum. Eine aufkommensneutrale Sen­
kung der Einkommensteuer bei gleichzeitiger Erhöhung der Umweltsteuer erhöht 
die Wachstumsrate des Sozialproduktes und- bestätigt die ,Double-Dividend“ 
Hypothese.
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